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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
COWS. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
truck struck a cow owned by the defendant. The evidence
showed that the defendant had learned on the day of the
accident that the cow had escaped from the defendant’s land
to a pasture 12 miles away. However, the defendant did not
look for the cow until the next day, the day after the
accident. The defendant testified that it was highly unusual
for a cow to escape and travel so far to another fenced
pasture. The evidence also showed that the defendant’s
fences were in good repair before and after the escape. The
trial court ruled that the defendant was not negligent as a
matter of law. The defendant argued that the ruling was
correct because the fences were in good repair and the
defendant had no reason to believe that the cow would
escape the neighbor’s fenced pasture. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the defendant should have known that
a cow which escaped the defendant’s fences and traveled 12
miles would probably escape other fences and travel a
sufficient distance to be on a public highway. Therefore, an
issue of fact remained as to whether the defendant exercised
sufficient reasonable care in not  immediately seeking to
capture the cow. Hand v. Starr, 550 N.W.2d 646 (Neb.
1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. During the year before
filing for bankruptcy, the debtor corporation was insolvent.
The corporation was owned by one individual, and the
shareholder’s spouse served as president, managing the
corporation business, a livestock feedlot. The same
shareholder also owned a real estate title company which
was also managed by the spouse. The debtor received eight
short term loans from the title company during the year
before the bankruptcy filing, each loan made only after the
prior loan was paid. The loans were made to allow the
debtor to meet cash flow needs from buying and selling
livestock. The trustee sought to have the transfers avoided
as preferential transfers to an insider of the debtor. The court
agreed that the transfers were preferential but held that the
transfers were not avoidable because the transfers were
made in the ordinary course of business for consideration.
The court noted, however, that some of the payments
exceeded the subsequent loans; therefore, the new value
exception did not apply to the extent that the payments
exceeded the value of the subsequent loans. In re Liberty
Livestock Co., 198 B.R. 365 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtor owned land neighboring the
land of a claimant in a Chapter 7 case. During development
of the debtor’s land, a workcrew cut down trees and
removed soil from the claimant’s land. A state court trial for
trespass was held and a jury verdict was entered against the
debtor for treble damages to the trees. The jury verdict
specifically found that the debtor had knowledge of the
trespass and failed to take any action to stop it. The claimant
sought to have the judgment debt declared nondischargeable
for willful and malicious damage to the claimant’s property.
The court held that the actions of the debtor were clearly
willful since the actions were done with knowledge of the
trespass. The court also found that the debtor’s actions were
malicious in that the trespass continued for several months
after the debtor was informed by the claimant that the
trespassing was occurring. The court held that the fact that
the damage was done by agents of the debtor did not affect
the ruling because the agents were working under the
control of the debtor. In re Sullivan, 198 B.R. 417 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1996).
The debtor operated a grain buying, trucking and selling
business and had purchased, but not paid for, substantial
amounts of grain from one creditor. The debtor’s business
records consisted primarily of canceled checks and bank
deposit slips. The debtor maintained no written records of
the specifics of any grain sales or purchases or trucking
expenses. The Bankruptcy Court held that the records were
sufficient to deny a motion by the creditor to deny discharge
to the debtor because an accountant could reconstruct the
necessary information with the help of testimony from the
debtor and because there was no evidence that the debtor
concealed or destroyed any records. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the burden was on the debtor to
produce records sufficient to determine the debtor’s
business affairs, the testimony of the debtor could not be
used to substitute for adequate written records, and the lack
of any destruction or concealment of records was irrelevant
to the issue of whether the records were sufficient. Matter
of Juzwiak, 89 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1996).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor originally filed for
Chapter 12 prior to the 1994 amendment of Section 522.
The case was converted to Chapter 7 after the amendment.
A creditor had a judgment lien against the debtors’ real
property which included several separate parcels of farm
land, one of which included the residence. The debtors had
no equity in any of the property and claimed a homestead
exemption for the residence parcel and the wildcard
exemption for the other parcels. The debtors sought to avoid
the judgment lien on all of the parcels as impairing the
claimed exemptions. Under the Ohio exemption statute and
prior Ohio bankruptcy cases, a judgment lien against exempt
property was not avoidable unless the judgment creditor had
begun foreclosure proceedings. The 1994 amendments to
Section 522 removed that obstacle, but the creditor argued
that the amendment did not apply to this case because the
original Chapter 12 case was filed prior to the amendments.
The court examined the legislative history of the
amendments and held that the amendments were intended to
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clarify the existing law as intended by Congress and to
overturn the Ohio rulings; therefore, the amendments could
be applied to this case. The creditor also argued that the
wildcard exemption could not be applied to several separate
parcels of real estate. The court held that the wildcard
exemption had no limitation as to the number or types of
properties which could be exempted and that the judgment
lien could be avoided on the basis of the wildcard
exemption for property in which the debtor had no equity.
In re Miller, 198 B.R. 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
ELIGIBILITY. The IRS had assessed the debtor for
$297,000 in owed taxes, penalties and interest, based, in
part, on allegations of tax fraud. The debtor brought an
action in the Tax Court challenging the assessment but filed
for Chapter 13 before the case was tried. The IRS moved to
dismiss the Chapter 13 case for lack of jurisdiction because
the debtor had more than $100,000 in unsecured debts. (The
post-1994 limit is $250,000.) The debtor argued that
because the tax liability was subject to a Tax Court
challenge, the debt was unliquidated and not included in the
debtor’s debts for purposes of Chapter 13 eligibility. The
debtor argued that the debt was unliquidated because the
exact amount was not determinable, the amount was in
dispute, and the debt was based on an allegation of fraud
which the IRS was required to prove. The court held that (1)
the amount of the claim was determinable under statutes and
regulations; (2) the issue of the debtor’s liability is not a
factor in determining the liquidated status of a claim; and
(3) disputed claims are considered debt for purposes of
Chapter 13 eligibility. United States v. Verdunn, 89 F.3d
799 (11th Cir. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENT OF TAXES.
The debtor was a small corporation with three employees,
the sole shareholder who was the uncompensated president,
the shareholder’s spouse who was the paid bookkeeper, and
an unrelated employee. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 and
the plan provided that payments made to the IRS were to be
applied to employment tax trust fund obligations first,
interest on the taxes second and penalties third. The effect of
the allocation was to have nondischargeable taxes paid first
with dischargeable taxes paid last, an advantage for the
debtor should the plan fail. The IRS objected to the plan
provision in that the debtor had not shown that the
allocation was necessary for a successful reorganization.
The debtor provided only testimony of the shareholder that
the provision would be an incentive to work hard to make
the reorganization a success. The court held that the plan
could not be confirmed in that the debtor failed to show that
the reorganization could not succeed without the plan
provision. In re Classic Chemical & Supply Co., 198 B.R.
112 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a claim for taxes in the debtor’s
Chapter 13 case. The debtor challenged the claim, under
Bankr. Rule 3001 on the basis that (1) the claim did not
include any supporting facts, (2) the claim was not based on
a writing, and (3) the agent who filed the claim did not have
personal knowledge of the claim. The court held that the
claim was sufficient because (1) a properly filed claim had a
presumption of validity, (2) the claim was based upon the
IRS statutory authority to assess taxes, and (3) Rule 3001
did not require personal knowledge for claimant’s agents.
The court also held that the debtor failed to provide any
evidence to rebut the claim. In re Hollars, 198 B.R. 270
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtors were audited in 1984 for tax
deficiencies for 1975 through 1982 which were eventually
determined by a Tax Court to exceed $2 million. Soon after
the audit, the debtors began a series of asset transfers to
their children, friends and new corporations in attempts to
remove the assets from the reach of IRS liens and
assessments. For example, the debtors had themselves
removed from the payroll of one corporation after the IRS
attempted to attach the wages. The debtors even went to the
extreme of selling their residence to friends and renting the
friends’ house as their new residence. The debtors also paid
off all debts other than the tax debt. The trial court held that
the taxes were nondischargeable, under Section
523(a)(1)(C), for willfully attempting to evade the taxes.
The debtors argued that all of the transfers were bona fide
and made for personal and family reasons. The appellate
court upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the
debtors’ stated intentions were not credible. The appellate
court also upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s holding that the
debtors’ actions demonstrated in whole a willful attempt to
evade payment of taxes, even though any one particular
action could have been bona fide and for reasons
independent of the tax debt. Matter of Zuhone, 88 F.3d
469 (7th Cir. 1996).
The debtors failed for several years to make estimated
tax payments or pay taxes when they filed their income tax
returns. Several of the returns were also filed late. Although
the debtors made some attempts to negotiate installment
payment of the taxes, agreements were never reached. The
debtors then joined a tax avoidance organization and
removed assets to the organization in an attempt to avoid
payment of the taxes. The debtors used letters and forms
provided by the organization to mislead the IRS and to
make frivolous arguments about their tax status. Only when
the IRS began to attach the debtors’ property with tax liens
did the debtors give up on the tax avoidance organization
and seek payment negotiations with the IRS. The court held
that, although the non-payment of taxes was insufficient
evidence of intent to evade payment of taxes, the debtors’
actions went beyond mere nonpayment and included
attempts to hide assets and mislead the IRS; therefore, the
taxes were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C). In
re Spirito, 198 B.R. 624 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
The taxpayer was a beneficiary of a one-fourth interest
in a trust. In May 1992, the taxpayer, spouse and the IRS
reached an agreement in a Tax Court case determining the
taxpayer’s tax deficiencies for 1985 through 1987. The
taxpayer claimed to have assigned the taxpayer’s interest in
the trust to the taxpayer’s spouse in April 1992, but the
taxpayer continued to receive distributions from the trust. In
addition, the trustee did not receive any notice of the
assignment until June 1993. The IRS issued notices of levy
on the trust interest and the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy the
next day. The court held that the taxes were
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nondischargeable because the trust assignment was a willful
attempt to evade payment of taxes. In re Ward, 96-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,450 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
REFUND. The debtors did not file income tax returns
for 1986 and 1987 until 1993. The IRS had filed an
assessment for the 1986 and 1987 taxes in 1990 but agreed
in this case that no taxes were due for those years. The
debtors’ 1986 and 1987 returns requested a refund which the
IRS denied as untimely. The court held that the limitation
period for refund requests is, under I.R.C. § 6402(a), three
years from the due date of the return, with extensions, for
which the refund was claimed; therefore, the debtors’ refund
requests were untimely and the refunds could not be
required to be offset against the IRS claims in the
bankruptcy case. Willis v. United States, 198 B.R. 201
(S.D. Tex. 1996).
SETOFF. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case on January
12, 1996, and filed the debtor’s 1995 income tax return on
January 22, 1996, claiming a refund. The IRS refused to pay
the refund, holding the refund as a setoff against prior taxes
owed by the debtor. The debtor argued that the refund was a
post-petition obligation of the IRS which was not subject to
setoff against pre-petition obligations of the debtor. The IRS
argued that the refund effective date should be the last date
of the tax year for which the refund was sought. The court
cited I.R.C. § 6407 which provided that the allowance date
of a refund was the date the IRS first authorizes the
scheduling of an overassessment; therefore, the refund
obligation could not arise until the debtor filed an income
tax return. The IRS argued that allowing the refund effective
date to be determined by the filing of the return gave the
debtor too much power to manipulate the status of the
refund as a post-petition obligation. The court noted that the
debtor would have this power even with the IRS’s refund
date because the debtor could have filed the case prior to
December 31, 1995 and achieved the same result. The court
held that the IRS could not set off the refund because the
refund was a post-petition obligation. In re Glenn, 198 B.R.
106 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
APPEALS. The petitioners appealed an adverse ruling
of the FmHA (now FSA) to the National Appeals Division
(NAD) and obtained a reversal, allowing a loan
restructuring. The petitioners applied for legal fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) which were denied.
The court held that the NAD appeal was an adjudication
under the Administrative Procedures Act which allowed
recovery of fees under the EAJA. The court specifically
held that the appeal procedures were based, in part, on the
APA because the statutes and regulations concerning the
NAD appeal procedures did not supplant the APA
procedures but only added to them. Although the NAD
decision did not make a finding that the original agency
determination was not substantially justified, the appellate
court reviewed the NAD decision and found that the agency
determination was based on numerous errors and inadequate
recordkeeping; therefore, the court held that the agency
determination was not substantially justified and the
petitioners were entitled to recover legal fees under the
EAJA. Lane v. USDA, 929 F. Supp. 1290 (D. N.D. 1996).
CONSERVATION. The CCC and NRC have adopted
as final regulations implementing the Wetlands Reserve
Program. 61 Fed. Reg. 42175 (Aug. 14, 1996).
The CCC has issued a request for proposals from states,
tribes, and local governments for cooperation in the
acquisition of conservation easements or other interests in
prime, unique or other productive soil for the purposes of
limiting non-agricultural use of that land. 61 Fed. Reg.
43226 (Aug. 21, 1996).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations providing specific provisions
for the insurance of Texas citrus fruit crops in conjunction
with the Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic Provisions.
61 Fed. Reg. 41297 (Aug. 8, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
specific provisions for the insurance of walnut crops in
conjunction with the Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic
Provisions. 61 Fed. Reg. 41527 (Aug. 9, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
specific provisions for the insurance of almond crops in
conjunction with the Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic
Provisions. 61 Fed. Reg. 41531 (Aug. 9, 1996).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations implementing
the Catastrophic Risk Protection Program. 61 Fed. Reg.
42979 (Aug. 20, 1996).
FARM LOANS. The FSA has adopted as final
regulations establishing new policies and procedures for the
release from liability of guaranteed loan borrowers and co-
signers. 61 Fed. Reg. 43147 (Aug. 21, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].* The decedent owned and operated a cattle
ranch with the decedent’s son. The decedent owned land
used in the ranch. The son owned other property used in the
business. The decedent operated the ranch in part by a
partnership with the son and in part as a sole proprietor. The
son contributed part of the son’s property to the partnership
with the remainder of the son’s property used by the
partnership but owned by the son. The decedent also
allowed the partnership to use the decedent’s land and
retained separate ownership of the land. The decedent was
actively involved in the management of the partnership and
proprietorship businesses. The partnership paid the real
estate taxes, casualty and liability insurance and fencing
costs for the property used by the partnership but the
partnership did not pay rent for the use of the separately
owned property. The IRS ruled that (1) the decedent was
carrying on the cattle business both as a partner and as a
sole proprietorship, (2) the decedent’s land was essential to
the operation as a partnership and sole proprietorship, and
(3) the fact that the decedent owned the land separately from
the partnership did not affect the decedent’s eligibility for
installment payment of estate tax because the income from
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the land was derived from the cattle business and not from
rent of the land. Ltr. Rul. 9635004, May 15, 1996.
LIFE INSURANCE. The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the taxpayer’s children.
The taxpayer’s brother was named as trustee and the
taxpayer and spouse were prohibited from becoming the
trustee. The trustee had the discretion, during the taxpayer’s
lifetime, to distribute trust income to the taxpayer’s issue.
The trust terminated at the earlier of the taxpayer’s death or
the passing of 25 years. The trust was funded with a cash
gift which was used to purchase a life insurance policy on
the taxpayer’s life. The trustee then entered into a split-
dollar arrangement with the taxpayer’s spouse under which
the trust paid a portion of the policy premiums equal to the
lesser of (1) the applicable amount in the P.S. 58 tables in
Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228 and (2) the published
premium rate for individual one-year term life insurance
available to all standard risks of the insurance company
issuing the policy. The spouse paid the rest of the premium
from the spouse’s separate property. The agreement
terminated at the death or bankruptcy of the spouse or
failure of either party to perform under the agreement. If the
agreement terminated prior to the death of the taxpayer, the
spouse would receive the net cash value of the policy. Upon
the death of the taxpayer, the spouse would receive the
greater of the net cash value or the amount of premiums
paid by the spouse. The spouse’s interests in the policy were
secured by a promissory note and collateral assignment
agreement. The IRS ruled that the spouse’s payments of a
portion of the premiums would not be gifts to the trust from
the spouse or a deemed gift from the taxpayer. The IRS also
ruled that the insurance proceeds would not be included in
the taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9636033, March, 12,
1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer owned and
operated a tax preparation and consulting business. The
taxpayer had claimed deductions for office rent, equipment
rental and utility expenses; however, the taxpayer was
unable to substantiate many of the payments allegedly made
for these expenses and several records were found to be not
credible by the court. The court held that the taxpayer was
not allowed deductions for which no supporting record was
available. Miller v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-402.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. A corporation obtained
a nonrecourse loan from a bank in order to purchase
computer equipment. The corporation then entered into a
sale/leaseback agreement with the taxpayer. The taxpayer
transferred the computer equipment to a school which
agreed to assume the nonrecourse obligation. The court held
that the taxpayer could not claim a charitable deduction
from the transfer because the amount of the nonrecourse
obligation assumed by the school exceeded the taxpayer’s
basis in the equipment. Brown v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-325.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period October 1, 1996 through December 31, 1996, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent and for
underpayments is 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 11 percent. The
interest rate on corporate overpayments above $10,000 is
6.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 96-44, I.R.B 1996-__.
MILEAGE EXPENSE. The taxpayer owned and
operated an accounting practice. The taxpayer incurred
automobile expenses from the use of the taxpayer’s car in
traveling to meet with clients of the firm. The taxpayer was
not reimbursed by the firm for these expenses and claimed
the expenses on the taxpayer’s individual tax return. The
taxpayer maintained a log of which clients were visited each
day. The log did not contain information about the location
of the meetings or what was discussed. The taxpayer had
been audited for a prior tax year and only 82 percent of the
automobile expenses were allowed. The taxpayer argued
that 82 percent of the claimed expenses should also be
allowed for the tax year involved in this case. The court held
that the expenses were properly disallowed for lack of
substantiation and that the IRS was not required to use an
estimate from a previous year. Thomas v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-403.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August
1996, the weighted average is 6.92 percent with the
permissible range of 6.22 to 7.47 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.22 to 7.61 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
43, I.R.B. 1996-__.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. Three years
after the period for assessments against the partnership
lapsed, the IRS sent a Notice of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment to the “Tax Matters Partner” at
the partnership address. Several partners received the
generic FPAA, including the partner with the largest share
of partnership profits. The FPAA was mailed within the
limitation period for the notice. The partnership argued that
the notice was untimely filed because it was mailed after the
period for assessments had lapsed. The court held that the
limitation period for FPAAs was independent of the
assessment limitation period. The court also held that the
failure of the FPAA to specifically name the tax matters
partner did not invalidate the notice. Wayne Caldwell
Escrow Partnership v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-401.
An S corporation was a pass-through partner of a general
partnership. The S corporation had two individuals as
shareholders who were considered indirect partners of the
general partnership under I.R.C. § 6231(a)(10). The S
corporation was also the tax matters partner in the
partnership but lost that status when it filed for bankruptcy.
The IRS filed a FPAA with the general partnership and
notified the S corporation that, as a result of the bankruptcy
filing, the corporation’s partnership items were converted to
nonpartnership items and no longer subject to the FPAA or
reviewable in FPAA proceedings. The two shareholders
timely filed a petition for readjustment and the IRS argued
that the petition was not allowed because the corporation’s
partnership items were converted to nonpartnership items.
The court held that, because the shareholders were not
debtors in the bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy filing did not
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affect their rights as indirect partners as to the FPAA
proceeding. Third Dividend/Dardanos Associates v.
Comm’r, 88 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1996).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. See Ltr. Rul.
9636007, May 30, 1996 under S CORPORATIONS infra.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELIGIBILITY. An S corporation reorganized as a
limited liability company in a tax-free reorganization, under
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F), with all shareholders receiving an
equivalent interest in the LLC. The IRS ruled that (1) the
LLC had the corporate characteristic of continuity of life
because the LLC agreement provided that the bankruptcy,
death, dissolution, expulsion, incapacity or withdrawal of
any member did not result in the dissolution of the LLC; (2)
the LLC had the corporate characteristic of centralized
management because the LLC was managed by a board of
directors; and (3) the LLC had the corporate characteristic
of limited liability because the members of the LLC had no
personal liability for the debts of the LLC. Therefore, the
LLC was taxable as a corporation. The IRS also ruled that
the LLC continued to be eligible for S corporation status if
the reorganization did qualify as tax-free under I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(F). Ltr. Rul. 9636007, May 30, 1996.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that new Form
2553, Election by a Small Business Corporation, and
instructions are available.
TAX LIENS. The taxpayer was the son of a farmer who
owned a one-fourth interest in farm land, with the other
interests owned by the father’s siblings. Apparently, the
father operated the farm alone. In 1984, under the threat of
an impending law suit, the father transferred his interest in
the farm to the taxpayer when the taxpayer was three years
old in exchange for no consideration. The transfer was
intended to place the farm outside the reach of the potential
judgment creditor. The father continued to operate the farm
and had control over all assets and income from the farm.
Farm equipment was purchased with farm income and was
held in the father’s name. No rent was paid to the taxpayer
for use of the farm. The IRS assessed taxes owed for 1984,
1986, 1988 and 1990 by the father. In May 1995, the IRS
issued a Notice of Levy and Notice of Seizure on the farm.
The taxpayer, through a court-appointed conservator,
challenged the lien and levies as wrongful because the son
did not owe any taxes. The court looked to Wyoming law
for its holding that the father’s transfer of the farm to the
son was a fraudulent transfer because the transfer was made
without consideration and the transfer made the father
insolvent. The court held that the fraudulent conveyance
rule applied even though the IRS was not a creditor at the
time of the transfer. The also held that the taxpayer held title
to the farm as the father’s nominee for the same reasons that
the transfer was fraudulent plus the father continued to
exercise dominion and control over the property and to
receive the benefits of the property. Therefore, the farm was
subject to the tax lien and levy for the father’s taxes.
Jessen v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,449 (D. Wyo. 1996).
The taxpayer was a shareholder in a family farm
corporation. The taxpayer built a residence on corporate
land using the taxpayer’s separate funds, although the
taxpayer did not pay real estate taxes on the land nor rent to
the corporation for the use of the land. The taxpayer owed
taxes for unreported drug sales and the IRS filed a tax lien
against the residence. The IRS sought to foreclose on the
lien by selling the taxpayer’s stock in the corporation and
the four acre residential parcel of the farm. Title to the four
acres was in the name of the corporation. The IRS argued
that the corporation was merely the alter ego of the taxpayer
but the court held that the corporate form could not be
disregarded because the taxpayer did not exercise control
over corporate affairs. The court also ruled that the payment
of real estate taxes and the failure to charge rent did not
indicate that the corporation was the alter ego of the
taxpayer, because the corporation was responsible for the
taxes as title holder and the title to the land and
improvements was not transferred to the taxpayer; thus, the
benefits of the residence inured to the corporation. The court
also rejected the IRS argument that the corporation held title
to the four-acre parcel as the taxpayer’s nominee, because
the corporation acquired title to the land long before any
residence was constructed. The IRS also sought to foreclose
on the taxpayer’s interest in the corporation by seeking sale
of the taxpayer’s interest in all of the corporation’s assets.
The court held that the lien attached only to the taxpayer’s
shares of stock. United States v. Miller, 96-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,445 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HAY BALER. The plaintiff was injured while loading
hay by hand into a hay baler manufactured by the defendant.
The plaintiff presented evidence of similar accidents with
the same model of hay baler and claimed that the defendant
had knowledge that the hay baler was dangerous in that it
could grab hay faster than an operator could release the hay,
thus pulling hands and arms into the machinery. The
plaintiff requested a jury instruction on the defendant
continuing duty to warn but was refused. The appellate
court reviewed Illinois law on the duty to warn and held that
the case law indicated that there was no continuing duty of a
manufacturer to warn purchasers of the manufacturer’s
products. The court distinguished the case of Seegers Grain
Co., Inc. v. United States, 577 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. Ct. App.
1991), which held that a steel manufacturer had a duty to
warn a customer about a similar accident which occurred
within a month prior to the accident in the case, where the
products were specifically designed for the injured party and
the manufacturer had specific knowledge of the intended
use and the inappropriateness of the manufacturer’s product
for the intended use. The court noted that, in this case, the
hay baler was a generic product sold over-the-counter to a
buyer unknown to the manufacturer; therefore, the Seeger
special rule did not apply. Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d
518 (7th Cir. 1996).
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TRACTOR. The plaintiff was injured while employed
on a sugarcane farm. The plaintiff was helping to remove a
tractor and cutter implement from some muddy ground by
pulling on the implement with a chain attached to another
tractor. The driver of the stuck tractor left the driver’s seat
with the tractor still running in order to help the plaintiff.
The stuck tractor went into reverse gear and backed the
cutter over the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the tractor
was defectively design in that the tractor could be in gear
when the shift lever was placed in the neutral position. The
defendant tractor manufacturer claimed that the driver of
the stuck tractor merely failed to properly place the tractor
in neutral before leaving the cab. The plaintiff appealed a
jury verdict for the defendant and argued that hearsay
evidence was impermissibly admitted at the trial. The
appellate court held that the evidence, testimony of the
employer as to what the plaintiff said that the tractor driver
said, was inadmissible hearsay. The appellate court then
went on to a de novo review of the evidence and held that
the defendant’s experts’ testimony was more credible that
the tractor was not negligently designed and that any defect
in the shift mechanism was caused by normal wear from
use. Clay v. International Harvestor Co., 674 So.2d 398
(La. Ct. App. 1996).
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